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5. Further extensions
As noted in section 2, the framework of the present paper has two main shortcomings. First,
residence-based taxes cannot be properly analysed as the domestic supply of capital is fixed.
Second, since labour is sector specific, ad-hoc assumptions must be introduced in order to rule
out the possibility of implementing the first-best solution by levying diﬀerential taxes at the
firm level.
The first drawback can be overcome by extending the model to a two-period framework as in
Bucovetstky and Wilson (1991) and Razin and Sadka (1991). In the first period no production
or trade takes place. Consumers only choose how much to consume out of the same inherited
lump-sum income. In the second period the economy is represented by the model analysed in
this paper, except for the elastic saving supply, which stems from the choice made in the first
period.
The arguments used to establish the optimality of source- and origin-based taxes in the static
model8 are still valid in the two-period framework with residence-based capital taxation. Source-
and origin based taxes aﬀect welfare exclusively through their impact on wages. They are not
a substitute for residence-based taxation, as in Haufler (1997) and Lopez et al. (1996), since
they do not influence the consumer interest rate. Consequently, the government resorts to them
only if they can improve on the distribution of wages that can be implemented with the tax
on labour income. For the source-based capital tax this is possible only if ε1wr 6= ε2wr. Further,
origin-based commodity taxes have opposite eﬀects on the wage distribution. This implies that
the optimal tax rate ratio is still defined by (3.36). As to the sign, the source-based capital tax
8The formal analysis of the two period model is contained in a previous version of this paper, Arachi (1999).
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can be positive or negative depending on the elasticities of wages with respect to the interest rate
and on the social evaluation of labour income redistribution. However, since the latter depends
on the residence-based capital tax, it is diﬃcult to identify the precise conditions that yield a
positive source-based capital tax. These remarks apply to destination-based commodity taxes as
well. Destination-based taxes leave the wage distribution unaﬀected since they do not impinge
on producer commodity prices. Hence, they only aﬀect the choice of source- and origin-based
taxes indirectly by altering the social evaluation of labour income redistribution.
The second limitation of the paper can be overcome by showing that the analysis developed
in the preceding sections extends to the more general case where each sector employs both types
of labour.
Condition (3.9) can be rewritten as follows
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This condition must hold in the optimum even in the case where both types of labour enter into
the production of each commodity. The diﬀerences between the general and the specific factor
model lie in the derivatives of wages and domestic capital stock. In the general case, equation
(3.3) must be replaced by9
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where Lij denotes the amount of labour of type i employed in sector j, while the function γ
iLi,
that yields the equilibrium capital stock in sector i, must be replaced by
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The same argument applies to the remaining first-order conditions of problems (3.4), (3.15)
and (4.4). Consequently, the optimal source-based capital income tax must still satisfy, in the
more general framework, the crucial conditions (3.11), (3.20), and (4.10). A corollary of this
conclusion is that the results stated in propositions (3.1), (3.2) and (4.1) do not depend on
whether production requires just one or both types of labour. Further, the sign of the optimal
source-based tax rate on capital can be determined on the basis of (3.24) and (4.11), provided
the domestic capital stock is a decreasing function of the interest rate.10 Expression (5.2) implies
that a positive source-based tax may actually increase one of the two wages. For example, the
wage of the unskilled rises when the industry that employs the higher share of unskilled labour
uses more skilled labour than capital (i.e. L2i
±
L2j > L
1
i
±
L1j and K
j
±
Ki > L1j
±
L1i ). In this
case the optimality of a source-based tax can be established without knowing wage elasticities,
as the diﬀerence ε1wr− ε2wr cannot be equal to zero.
The results obtained for origin-based commodity taxation hold in the general framework as
well. However, the analysis becomes much more intricate as each tax aﬀects both wages. The
10With a linear labour income tax this guarantees a positive ∆ in (3.23).
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first order conditions (3.31) and (3.32) must be replaced by two equations similar to (3.31), i.e.
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It can be easily verified that the substitution of the first-order condition for the tax on labour
income into (5.4) yields two equations similar to (3.20). These equations will contain two terms.
The first is given by the product of one of the two curly bracket in (5.4) and the diﬀerence
between the elasticities of the two wages with respect to the price of the taxed commodity.
The second term is the eﬀect of a change in the commodity price on government revenue. The
diﬀerence between wage elasticities is never equal to zero since the right hand sides of (5.5) and
(5.6) show that a price change has opposite eﬀects on the two wages. Hence Proposition 3.4
can be restated in the general framework: the government resorts to diﬀerential origin-based
commodity taxation whenever the expressions in square brackets in (5.4) are diﬀerent from zero
under an optimal linear labour tax.
By further substituting one of the two necessary conditions for optimal commodity taxes
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into the other, one obtains an equation that defines the optimal ratio between the two tax rates.
This equation shares the two main characteristics of (3.36). First, the optimal tax ratio does
not depend on the shape of the social welfare functional as the expression in square brackets
in (5.4) has been eliminated through the substitution. Second, the two tax rates have opposite
signs, as they bring about opposite changes in wage distribution.
Following the same steps, one can also generalise the conclusions reached under an optimal
non-linear income tax.
6. Concluding remarks
The analysis developed in the paper shows that source- and origin-based taxes are constrained-
eﬃcient instruments in a small open economy when consumers diﬀer in skills and the government
cannot implement the optimal diﬀerential linear taxation of labour since it cannot directly
observe individuals’ characteristics. The rationale for such taxes is quite diﬀerent from the
one provided by the existing literature, which studies large open economies where source-based
taxation is seen as a substitute for residence-based taxation.
In a small open economy source- and origin-based taxes are shifted completely onto immobile
labour. Where a linear tax is levied on labour income, source- and origin-based taxes can act
as substitutes for diﬀerential taxation of labour if the various types of labour bear a diﬀerent
tax burden. By contrast, if a non-linear tax is levied on labour income, source- and origin-
based taxes cannot directly improve income distribution as the two types of labour are taxed
at two diﬀerent marginal rates. However, they may still improve social welfare as they relax
the self-selection constraint that binds the non-linear tax by changing the distribution of gross
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